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Summary findings
Rajapatirana examines the relationship between trade  *  For trade  liberalization to work, there must be real
policies and macroeconomic adjustment in six Latin  devaluation either before or during liberalization.
American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,  Reluctance to devalue, for one reason or another,  may
Costa Rica, and Mexico.  lead to trade restrictions. There is evidence that trade
For the period 1965-94,  the six countries experienced  restrictions were used in lieu of devaluations during
26 trade policy episodes: 11 of tightening, and 15 of  1965-83.  In 1984-94,  however, the reluctance to
loosening trade policies.  devalue was overcome.
For the analysis, Rajapatirana worked with four  *  Growth in manufactured exports helps maintain
periods that coincided with different prevailing exchange  trade reform and release the economy from foreign
rate regimes: 1965-73,  1974-79,  1980-83,  and  1984-  exchange constraints. As expected, trade liberalization
94. Using a probit model, he examined the relationship  improved exports  (liberalization reduces the bias against
between tightening and loosening trade policies and the  exports) while trade tightening hurt them.
current account balance, the exchange rate, and the  *  The impact of trade reform on the fiscal system
growth in manufacturing exports. His main conclusions:  cannot be predicted because tax revenues can go in either
- Experience in these six countries for 1965-94  direction depending on initial conditions, the elasticity of
confirmed the hypothesis that trade restrictions cannot  supply in importable and exportable  sectors, and the
solve current accounr problems.  economy's growth rate.
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The principal  question in  the literature  on the  relationship between  trade  policies  and
macroeconomic  adjustment  is  how  macroeconomic  adjustment  impinges upon  trade  policy
making.  Most of the research on the sequencing of trade policies postulates that macroeconomic
stabilization and adjustment should precede trade policy reforms.  This is based on the argument
that macroeconomic disequilibrium--which appears as inflation or current account deficits-- leads
to  overvalued  exchange  rates  and  undermine  trade  policy  reforms."'  Many  studies  have
analyzed the relationship between macroeconomic policy changes and trade regimes.'
However, little research has been done about the reverse relationship of how trade policies
affect macroeconomic adjustment.  Countries experiencing macroeconomic imbalance,  such as
a current  account deficit that cannot be financed, have used and continue to use trade policies
to deal with the imbalance.  Thus, countries experiencing rising current  account deficits have
attempted to tighten trade policies while those experiencing rising current account surpluses that
lead to inordinate reserve accumulation have attempted to loosen or liberalize their trade policies.
In this sense, trade policies have been used as instruments for  macroeconomic adjustment, either
by  reducing  expenditures  on  imports through  import  restrictions,  or by  inducing  increased
expenditures on imports by liberalizing the import regime.  Raising the domestic price of imports
through quantitative restrictions (QRs) or through import tariffs induces a switch in expenditures
from  imports to  the domestic  market.  This  switch could  raise the price  of  non-tradables.
Exports are also affected to the extent that they use imported inputs and the existing bias against
exports  is  increased  because  their  profitability  relative to  import  substitutes and  other  non-
tradables falls.  Unless the import restrictions are accompanied by export subsides of one type
or another,  exports are adversely affected.
1/  See Edwards (1984) for instance.
2/  See Corden (1990) for a detailed discussion.2
The analytical basis for macroeconomic adjustment is well summarized by Corden (1990).
A small  open economy has a current  account deficit which needs  to be  removed.  The  less
foreign credits are available the more speedily this has to be done.  The standard analysis is that
total expenditure by government  and the private sector has to  fall.  This  is the reduction  in
'absorption'  which reduces demand for both tradables and nontradables.  In addition, there has
to be a real devaluation which shifts both the pattern of domestic demand from tradables towards
nontradables and the output pattern from tradables towards nontradables.  This is a 'switching'
policy which ensures that the process of 'external balance' takes place while 'internal balance'--
overall employment--is being maintained.  Without such a switching, the reduction in domestic
demand  required  to  improve  the  current  account  would  result  in  excess  supply  and
unemployment in the nontradable sectors of the economy.3'
If the policy instrument to bring about switching is to be exchange rate adjustment,  it is
necessary that a real devaluation does take place as a result of nominal devaluation.  If wages
rise when the price of imports and the cost of living rise, or if there has not been an adequate
expenditure reduction so that the devaluation-induced rise in demand for nontradables creates
excess demand and then some inflation of nontradable prices (or,  more broadly,  of prices of
home-produced goods), a real devaluation will not be achieved.  It is common that initially a
nominal devaluation does bring about a real devaluation, but that its effects are gradually eroded
at least to a partial extent.  A great deal hinges on whether monetary policies are accommodating
or not.  Here,  the experiences of developing countries have varied greatly.
Given this framework, it is clear that the recourse to trade policy instruments to deal with
a current account deficit or a surplus is related to a government's reluctance to use the exchange
rate to switch expenditures or to cut expenditures through absorption policies.  Here again, trade
policies are used as surrogates for macroeconomic policies.  In the face of rising and monetized
current account surpluses, inflation and an appreciation of the exchange rate will result,  if fiscal
3/  See ch. I of Corden (1985) for a diagrammatic  exposition  of this standard  analysis. The basic theory
originated  with Meade (1951) and th  concept  of switching  with Johnson  (1958).3
and monetary  macroeconomic policies are not used to deal with an accumulation of reserves.
While such an appreciation  is at times warranted, an over-shooting of the exchange rate must
be avoided.'
Many  countries  in  Latin  America  have  resorted  to  trade  policies  to  deal  with
macroeconomic imbalances.  This paper examines the use of trade policies as instruments of
macroeconomic adjustment in six Latin American countries--Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Mexico.  These six countries provide a rich collection of experiences given their
past large macroeconomic imbalances.  Both liberalization and tightening trade policy episodes
are reviewed to evaluate their effectiveness.  The general conclusion that emerges is that trade
policies  have no effect  on the current  account balance beyond  their immediate effect  in  the
presence  of  other  relevant  variables  such as  the  real  exchange  rate,  demand  in  importing
countries,  the fiscal  deficit and  the  terms  of  trade.  This  may be  one  reason  why  the  six
countries  have not used trade  policies for macroeconomic purposes after  1991.  However,  it
should be noted that  in the wake of the Mexican peso crisis  in December  1994,  Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico increased tariffs marginally.  These measures have been adopted mainly for
revenue reasons and therefore should not really be viewed as departures from the commitment
to liberalization  and an  open trade  regime.  At one  level, this  recourse to  trade policies  for
macroeconomic  purposes  was necessary  for  these countries  since  they were  operating  in  a
virtually fixed exchange rate environment.
In particular,  it  is  interesting to  consider  these issues in the  context  of  manufactured
exports.  Manufactured exports play an important role in macroeconomic adjustment. For one,
an  increase  in  manufacturing  exports  removes  foreign  exchange  constraints,  gives  greater
confidence to policy makers to sustain trade reforms,  and creates  a lobby that would support
fuller trade reforms.  In the case of the East Asian countries for instance, manufactured exports
played a critical role in sustaining macroeconomic adjustment and indeed became the foundation
4/  See Dornbusch  (1980) for an elabeoation  of this result.4
for high  output growth.  In the case of the six countries  studied here,  though the growth  in
manufacturing exports has been modest, it has helped the process of overall liberalization.
The rest  of the paper is divided into five sections:  II.  Evolution of trade  policies  for
macroeconomic  adjustment  in the  six countries;  III.  Trade  and  exchange  rate  policies;  IV.
Effects of trade policy episodes; and V. Conclusions.
II.  Evolution  of Trade  Policies  for  Macroeconomic  Adjustment
in  the  Six Countries
Since the mid- 1  960s the six Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Mexico, have used some sort of trade policies for macroeconomic adjustment.
In particular,  an increase  in import restrictions has been the normal  response to  a balance of
payments deficit.  Also,  there  have been many episodes  of  liberalization  of  trade  policies
associated with improving balance of payments positions.
The most common and effective trade policy instrument used to deal with current account
deficits has been quantitative restrictions (QRs).  This method has usually consisted of shifting
import  items from  a free  list to  a  QR list.  Conversely,  trade  policies  were  liberalized  by
increasing the number of items on the free  list.  At times QRs have been applied to all imports.
Some countries  have subjected all imports to QRs unless they are  included in a positive  list.
Others  have freely admitted all imports unless  included in a negative list.  A switch  from  a
positive  list system to a negative list system could represent a substantial liberalization.
Since 1965 there have been twenty six trade episodes with eleven trade policy tightenings
and fifteen liberalizing episodes in the six countries (table 1).  These episodes are identified on
the basis of changes in import quotas, tariffs, export taxes, and subsidies in each country.  QRs
were the most common tool.  Tariffs, export subsidies, and taxes played a minor role in these5
episodes.  In most  instances, tariffs  were  imposed mainly for  revenue  purposes.  At times,
export  taxes  were  raised  simultaneously with  a devaluation  to  siphon off  the higher  export
revenues in domestic currency resulting from a devaluation.  Sometimes export subsidies were
used to offset the bias against exports arising from an increase in the items subject to quotas or
an accompanying increase in tariffs.
What is of interest in analyzing the use of trade policies for macroeconomic adjustment
purposes are the changes in the direction and extent of trade policy,  and the duration  of the
policy episode.  The duration of each trade policy episode was measured as the period the policy
was maintained from the time it was introduced.  The episodes have been further identified on
the basis of detailed information obtained from Little, Cooper, Corden, and Rajapatirana (1993),
Papageorgiou,  Michaely,  and Choksi (1991) and, Alam and Rajapatirana (1993).
Within  the period  1965-94, there  are  four  distinguishable  subperiods  coinciding  with
changes in the exchange rate regimes.  Table  1 distinguishes these periods (1965-73,  1974-79,
1980-83, and 1984-94) related to changes in exchange rate regimes in these countries and indeed
for the whole world.  Argentina,  for example, had six episodes over  the whole period--three
trade liberalizing episodes and three trade tightening episodes.  Argentina and Brazil have had
the largest number of policy episodes over  the whole period; this  is not  surprising given the
large and persistent macroeconomic imbalances they experienced during the 1970s and  1980s.
These countries changed their trade regimes fundamentally after 1991. Chile, on the other hand,
had only three episodes with a fundamental trade reform or regime change in 1974.  Mexico also
had three episodes while Colombia and Costa Rica had four episodes each.  Table 2 shows that
in the first period (1965-73), there were six trade tightenings and nine liberalizations.  As might
be expected, the second and the third periods (1974-79 and 1980-83) which coincided with the
first  and  the  second  oil  shocks  (1973  and  1980) and  the  debt  shock  (1982)  were  mainly
characterized  by  tightening,  while  the  last  period  (1984-94)  was  one  of  liberalizing  trade
policies.  The increases in tariffs in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in early  1995 is avowedly a
temporary  measure in the wake of the Mexican Peso crisis and therefore  should not be viewed
as fundamental departure from the liberalization process.  However, it is indeed a case of using6
trade  policies  for  macroeconomic  purposes  and  the  results  of  the  past  efforts  become
immediately germane in judging the potential effects of these trade measures.  It is too early to
examine the effects of these early 1995 trade policy changes.  But, the experiences of the past
become even more important in visualizing the outcome  of these trade policy episodes beyond
the immediate effects.
The evolution of trade policies shows a number of characteristics.  First, when a current
account problem developed during the first three periods--1965-73,  1974-79, and  1980-83--the
tendency was to tighten QRs.  The trade tightening was usually done by shifting items from a
free  to  a  restricted  list.  The  change  in  trade  policy  was  an  important  instrument  of
macroeconomic adjustment policy in each case with the sole exception of Chile in 1974.  In the
case of Chile, there was a large current account deficit following the Allende government.  The
new government liberalized the trade regime and in doing so departed  from the then standard
response  to  a current  deficit.  Although trade  tightenings were  usually preceded  by  current
account deteriorations, this was not always the case.  Countries that had access to external funds
tended to finance the deficit rather than attempt to adjust.  This of course  was the right policy
response,  if  the deficit  was  expected to  be  temporary  and  if  it  could  be  financed  without
difficulty.  That was pretty much the case for nearly all the six countries before 1982.
In any case, a current account deficit could not be addressed by import restrictions alone
because there is no reduction  in excess demand that had created the current account deficit in
the first place.  On the other hand, the import restrictions  switch expenditure to the domestic
market including non-tradables and, at the same time, create a bias against exports.  If the latter
is not corrected,  the balance of payments problems will persist.  If the import restrictions have
been in place before, this could create a phenomenon known as import starvation which will lead
to  a  reduction  in  output  including  exports.  Exports  are  handicapped  by  the  difficulty  of
obtaining imported components and  inputs and sometimes through a real  appreciation.  As a
reaction to the country's  previous bad experience with protection itself, it becomes easy to find
support for liberalization.  The worse the previous experience,  the more drastic the change is7
likely to be.  Liberalization in such cases must always be preceded by, or associated with,  big
devaluations.
Second, during the fourth period (1984-94), worsening of the macroeconomic situation did
not lead to trade tightening but rather to trade liberalizations.  As noted before, this relationship
has been modified somewhat in the wake of the Mexican economic crisis  in December  1994.
Only one trade tightening took place during that period---Brazil's in 1988. This could be readily
explained by the balance of payments situation though it was also reversed  in  1990.  In five
other cases, deterioration of the current account led to a package of crisis policies that included
trade  liberalization--referred  in the recent  literature as  "the new liberalization  ".5' Therefore,
the earlier relationship between current account deficits and trade policies was broken.
The extreme case here is that of oil exporter, Mexico, which faced an adverse price shock
in  1985.  At this point the government saw that imposing import restrictions  was not a good
policy for all the familiar reasons.  Hence, contrary to earlier practice, Mexico instituted a trade
liberalization  program  and  other  measures  associated  with  structural  adjustment,  such  as
devaluation, tight fiscal policies,  and increases in public enterprise prices and privatization.
Third,  the  responses  to  current  account  deficits  have  been  asymmetric.  While
improvements  in  the  current  account  were  less  likely  to  lead  to  liberalizing  episodes,
deteriorations  in  the current  account were  more likely to  lead to  tightenings.  For example,
Colombia did  not  liberalize with the coffee boom of  1976-78. There  is of course  less of an
urgency to  adjust to a  surplus compared  to a  balance of payments deficit.  In other words,
countries were more prepared to live with an appreciation of the exchange rate arising from a
surplus that was monetized, than accept the need to devalue the currency and cut absorption.
There were two political economy reasons for this asymmetry: (i) except for Chile in 1974, these
countries were ideologically committed to trade restrictions as a means of promoting domestic
industry; and (ii) interest groups that were supporting import restrictions were more powerful
5/  See Little, Cooper, Corden and R  3patirana  (1993) for a more detailed  discussion.8
because  of  the long  tenure  of  the  import  substitution regime,  compared  to  consumers  and
exporters, who had to pay for the import restrictions in terms of higher prices and a bias against
the production of exportables.
Fourth, the various trade policy episodes were only mildly related to external shocks.  The
first period (1965-73) brought no significant external shocks other than the commodity boom at
the end of the period.  Trade tightenings resulted from current account problems which in turn
resulted  from  domestic policy  shocks.  In the second and third periods  (1974-78,  1980-83),
external shocks--the first and second oil shocks and the debt shock--did play a significant role
but they did not always have the expected effects.  For example, Colombia did not liberalize
with  the coffee  boom.  As  noted,  favorable current  account effects  did  not  always  lead  to
liberalization  while unfavorable effects did not always lead to trade tightening.  In the fourth
period (1984-94) the principal external shock was the 1986 collapse of oil prices.  However,  the
oil exporters,  Mexico and Colombia, did not tighten their trade policies.
One way to test the relationship between trade policies and macroeconomic adjustment is
by regressing trade policy changes on current account balances in the previous year.  The results
of these regressions are shown in equations 1 and 2.
TI,  =  -0.651* - 0.158  CA, *  (1)
(-1.82) (-1.80)
N =  26  LL  =  -15.66
TI,  =  -0.757*** - 0.144  CA,-,**  (2)
(-2.94)  (-2.49)
N=  60  LL  =  -34.43
where TI =  1 if there is a tightening of trade policies,  TI =  0 if there is a liberalizing of trade
policies,  and CA  =  (Current account balance/GDP).9
There are 60 events of trade policy tightening and liberalizing where the duration of each
episode is enumerated.6'  When the data are restricted to the first year of each episode, there
are 26 trade policy episodes.
The results of the probit 7'  analysis shows that it is more likely to encounter tightening in
the trade policies when the countries experienced a deficit in the current account in the previous
year."'  The  results  indicate  that  there  is  a  higher  probability  that  tightening episodes  are
associated with current account deficits.  Of course, not all current account deficits are followed
by tightening.
As  indicated by  these regressions,  the attempt  to use tightening and  liberalizing  trade
polices to affect macroeconomic adjustments have been a feature of these countries for the past
thirty years.  However,  Latin  American countries are not unique in this respect;  many other
countries have adopted similar responses when faced with macroeconomic imbalances.  What
is unique about Latin America though is the frequency and extent of the imbalances.2'
6/  The 60 events are the sum of all episodes  when the duration  of each episode  is counted  as one for each year.
7/  Given that the dependent  variable takes values  0 and 1, the OLS model will give biased estimators for any
sample  size.  The alternative  is to use (binary choice)  probit or logit models. These models  take the form:
P[Y, =  I/X,] = F(X,B).
While the probit model  uses a normal function, logit uses a logistic function  for the error term.  Since the two
functions  are very similar  and since  the use of the standard  normal cumulative  density  function  is less contested  in
the literature, we use the probit model  to test our hypotheses.
8/  Here and in the subsequent  equations,  the t-statistic  appears  in parentheses. Superscript  * indicates  significance
at the 10% level, superscript ** indicates  significance  at the 5% level, and superscript  *** indicates  significance
at the 1  % level. N indicates  the number  of observations,  and LL the log-likelihood  function.
9/  In a larger sample of eighteen  countries  to which  this group  of six countries  belongs,  there have been fifty nine
trade policy episodes,  while the six countries  have had twenty  six episodes.  Thus,these  six countries, which were
a  third of the larger sample account for nearly half of the trade episodes. See Little, Cooper, Corden and
Rajapatirana  (1993) for details.10
One way to capture the differences in trade policy responses to current account problems
during the first three periods and the fourth period is by running separate probit regressions for
the two periods  1965-83 and 1984-94.  These results are shown in equations 3 and 4.
1965-83:  TI,  =  -0.404  - 0.136  CA,-,*  (3)
(-1.21)  (-1.84)
N  39 LL  = -24.93
1984-94: TI, =  -1.525***  +  0.068CA,,  (4)
(-3.02)  (0.35)
N  = 21 LL  =  -3.79
These results show that the probit regressions for the two periods  1965-83 and  1984-94
are significantly different.  While the coefficient for the lagged current account balance, (CA,,),
is highly significant for the period 1965-83, it is not so for the period  1984-94.  This points to
significant differences in the response of trade policy to current account balances between these
two periods.  In other  words,  while trade  tightening episodes were  associated  with  current
account deficits in the 1965-83 period, there was no such relationship in the 1984-94 period.'"'
The trade policy changes associated with the new liberalization can also be described as
regime  changes.  For  this  sample of  six countries,  there  were  five  such regime  changes--
Argentina (1991), Brazil (1990), Chile (1974), Colombia (1991), and Mexico (1985)--and they
consisted of substantial trade liberalizations.  The defining feature of these was that following
such  a  trade  regime  change  there  was  no  recourse  to  trade  policies  for  macroeconomic
purposes. l'
For illustrative purposes, consider the first case of a regime change, that of Chile in 1974.
Before 1974, Chile had a highly restrictive trade regime with over five thousand tariff positions,
10/ This relationship was also confirmed when this regression was run with an explicit dummy variable for the year
effect. In the regression, the intercepts for the two time periods 1965-83 and 1984-94 turned out to be significantly
different.
11/  Argentina may be considered a minor exception in introducing customs fees in 1992 that could be interpreted
as a trade policy measure given that t'e  nominal exchange rate remained fixed.11
63 percent of which were subject to QRs.  Some two hundred of these positions were completely
banned while  nearly  two thousand  were  subject to  a prohibitive  ninety-day advance  deposit
requirement.  Between 1974 and 1976, all QRs, except six minor items, were abolished.  Tariff
rates which, at up to 750 percent, had been very high were reduced in three stages to a uniform
10 percent by 1979--except for automobiles and other vehicles.  Tariffs were increased in 1983
and reduced again in 1988, but the entire fourth period was one of openness.
While  the  balance  of  payments  crisis  created  the  shock  environment  in  which  trade
liberalization and other radical policy changes became possible,  there was also an intellectual
shift in the 1980s toward outward-oriented policies because of the new research that emphasized
their beneficial impact compared to inward-oriented policies.  Furthermore, the recommendations
and conditionalities of the international financial institutions also played a decidedly major role.
Countries with balance of payments problems needed the support of these institutions, and their
support  was only  forthcoming  if  some  credible  steps toward  liberalization  were  taken.  A
worldwide  ideological pro-market trend brought on by the success of East Asia and the patent
failures  of  state-centered  development  strategies  elsewhere  made  the  intellectual  case  for
liberalization that much easier.  These countries felt that there was no other way out of the crises
since there were no external funds available after the debt crisis.  The deficits could no longer
be financed, leaving adjustment as the only choice.
In 1990 and 1991, two of the most protectionist countries, Argentina and Brazil, embarked
on  liberalization  programs.  Argentina's  measures were quite drastic.  The hyperinflation of
1989 and a new reformist  government made drastic reforms  acceptable.  By 1990 Brazil also
greatly reduced the coverage of QRs.  Costa Rica provides a good example of liberalization with
support from the international financial institutions.  Owing to excessive fiscal expansion for the
first time in many years a serious balance of payments problem emerged in 1986.  This required
support from the international institutions and also emphasized the need for drastic stabilization
and adjustment.  However, Costa Rica is unique among the six countries for not undertaking  a
regime change in trade policy.12
III.  Trade and Exchange Rate Policies
The next issue to consider is the relationship between trade and exchange  rate policies.
Between 1965 and 1973 when balance of payments problems were rarer they led to trade policy
tightening in three countries--Argentina,  Colombia and Chile (table 2).  All three countries had
flexible exchange rates at the time.  From  1974 to 1979--the period encompassing the effects of
the first oil shock--there were two such cases, Brazil and Costa Rica.  The former continued a
flexible rate while the latter devalued while tightening trade policies.
In the next period,  1974-79, there was one instance of tightening of trade policies in the
context of a flexible exchange rate and this was Brazil.  Furthermore, when a truly serious crisis
came,  as  in  the third  period  (1980-83),  many countries  devalued  in  real  terms  as  well  as
tightened trade  restrictions.  Only Chile confined itself to using the exchange  rate instrument
with a strong commitment to outward orientation in trade.
On the  whole,  these episodes  indicate that  liberalization  was  always preceded  by,  or
directly associated with, devaluations.  There were fifteen liberalizations and all were associated
with devaluations or flexible exchange rates (table 2).  In the case of flexible rate regimes, real
devaluations  were  brought  about  by  rates  of  nominal  depreciation  that  exceeded  inflation
differentials. 't
The five trade regime changes tell an even more persuasive story.  It is inconceivable that
substantial  liberalizations--and  especially  "the  new liberalization"--would  have  been possible
without some flexibility in exchange rates.
12/  See Edwards  (1989).13
The hypothesis that trade  policy changes and devaluations have been used as substitute
instruments for balance-of-payments policy is confirmed by the regression of trade policies  on
devaluations, shown in equation 5.
Dev,  = -0.465*** -0.446  TI,**  (5)
(-4.55)  (-2.30)
N =  168  LL  =-101.80
where Dev  =  1 if there  is a  step wise nominal devaluation over  10 percent,  and Dev  =  0
otherwise. TI =  1 if there is a tightening of trade policies, TI =  0 if there is no change of trade
policies, and  TI =  -1 if there is a liberalizing of trade policies.
The regression results supports the hypothesis that liberalizing--and not tightening--of trade
policies has a greater probability of going together with devaluations of the nominal exchange
rate.  In other words, trade policy has been used in lieu of devaluation when countries have been
reluctant to devalue their currencies  in the face of a balance of payments problem.
IV.  The Effects of Trade Policy Episodes
The various trade policy measures had important microeconomic and long-term effects that
have been studied in detail."3'  The view of most economists and, since the mid-1980s, of most
policymakers  in  these countries  is  that  intervention,  especially  when  it  takes  the  form  of
quantitative import restrictions  and fosters an inward-looking orientation,  has had an adverse
effect  on  real  incomes  and  growth."- 4 /  The  spread  of  this  belief  explains  in  part  the
liberalization trend of the 1980s and early  1990s in these countries.
13/ See Bhagwati  (1989), Krueger  (1978), and Little, Scitovsky,  and Scott  (1970) for details.
14/ See Edwards  (1991) for instance14
A.  Effects  on Current Accounts
The  short-term  effects  of trade  policy episodes  on  outputs,  exports,  and  imports  are
difficult to  measure  in a  comprehensive way.  But these episodes  are  related to  subsequent
current account developments as shown in table 3.  An important point to remember here is that
a trade policy episode never happens on its own.  It is often associated with expenditure changes
and exchange rate changes.  If the current account improves after a tightening episode and if this
is associated with  a  devaluation in which  a  fiscal contraction  has also  taken place,  then the
subsequent current account development is the result of the whole policy package.  Furthermore,
subsequent exogenous shocks, such as changes in export prices, will affect the result.
In the  1980s and early  1990s, the new  liberalizations were  always associated with real
devaluations  and  often  with  crisis  measures that  involved fiscal  and  monetary  contraction.
Hence, the reform package did not necessarily worsen the current account.  The stabilization and
structural  adjustment packages  involved both  real devaluation  and  liberalization.  They also
brought with them added financial support from international financial institutions, governments,
and  eventually,  as in  the case of Mexico in  1991, from  the private  sector.  Continued,  and
possibly  greater,  current  account deficits  were thus  made possible.  In the  final analysis,  a
country can only sustain a current account that can be financed.  It is the availability of finance--
including  financing  obtained  through  rescheduling--that  will  determine  the  current  account
position.  If sufficient financing is not available, trade restrictions,  exchange rate adjustment,
and expenditure reductions will have to be used to improve the current account.  In practice, this
is the context in which trade policies come to be used as surrogates for macroeconomic policies.
To  summarize,  the  evidence  in  table  3  shows  that  on  average  the  current  accounts
worsened  marginally  following trade  liberalization and  improved marginally  following trade
tightening.  Improvements following tightenings did not last beyond a year.  It is therefore  not
surprising that the extent of the needed adjustment increased over time.  This is another reason
why the liberalizations were taking place in the late 1980s and the early  1990s.  Also by  1990,15
new capital had begun to flow to these countries that prevented further deterioration  in balance
of payments positions.
Table 4 presents the results of the panel data regressions of the current account balance
for the sample countries.  The independent variables are the real exchange rate,  fiscal balance
as a share of GDP, OECD growth  rate, the terms of trade and trade policy changes.  As shown
in the table,  all the variables emerge statistically significant and with the expected signs.  The
results suggest that, a one percent drop in last year's  output of the OECD countries will imply
a deterioration of the current account by roughly half a percent.
Regressions  II to  VI also  include the trade  policy variable  (TI).''  These  regressions
show that trade policies have no effect on current account in the presence of other variables like
real exchange rate, fiscal balance, GDP growth of OECD countries, and terms of trade.  These
results also imply that current account improvements following tightenings do not last for more
than three years.
B.  Effects on Fiscal Balances
A common assumption is that a reduction in  import tariffs and export  subsidies would
reduce  fiscal  revenues while  an  increase  would raise  revenues.  By  extension,  while trade
liberalization is expected to produce lower trade tax revenues, tightenings should raise trade tax
revenues;  a  further  assumption here  is  that  tariffs  and  subsidies  are  the only  or  the  more
dominant  trade instruments.  However,  the dynamic (growth) effects of trade policy episodes
are ignored here.
The principal method these countries used to tighten and liberalize trade policies was to
vary QRs.  Thus, a trade tightening based on an increase in QR coverage--at constant tariffs and
15/  TI =  1 if there is a tightening of trade policies, TI = 0 if there is no change of trade policies, and  TI =  -1
if there is a liberalizing of trade polici  R.16
subsidy rates--would lead to a decline in trade tax revenues.  Conversely, a liberalization would
raise  revenues.  These  effects  could  be  stronger  or  weaker depending  on  growth  effects,
devaluations,  QR coverage,  and of course,  the initial conditions and the relevant elasticity of
import and export demands.
In practice,  trade policy liberalizations were followed by reduced trade tax revenues in
some instances and increased revenues in others.  Similarly, tightening trade policies raised trade
tax revenues in some instances and reduced them in others (table 5).  The country experiences
suggest that both kinds of episodes may be followed by increases in trade tax revenues.  Trade
liberalization might be expected to increase trade tax revenues for several reasons.  First, as QRs
are reduced more is imported,  even at lower tariffs and higher export subsidy rates, and trade
tax revenues could increase.  Second, since devaluations usually accompany liberalizations the
valuation basis of exports and imports rises.  This leads to higher trade tax revenues even at the
same tax and subsidy rates.  Also, since most trade liberalizations take place with some balance
of payments support,  the increase in imports especially designed to alleviate import starvation
situations also leads to increased trade tax revenues.
Since the trade tax responses reviewed in table 5 are for over an interval of only two years
following the trade policy episodes, they may in fact have a downward bias since export supply
responds more slowly to trade liberalizations than imports.  Trade tax revenues are likely to go
up because of export growth over time.
In short, it is impossible to predict the extent,  and indeed the direction of the change in
trade  tax  revenues  resulting  from  trade  policy  changes and  therefore,  the  impact  of  these
episodes on the fiscal balance.  This is the main conclusion arising from the inquiry into the
relationship between trade policy episodes and the fiscal effects for these six countries. 16'
16/ See also Nogues  and Gulati  (1992) and Pritchett  and Sethi  (1994). In addition,  when  trade tax revenues  were
regressed  on trade policy episodes,  th  trade policy  term turned out to be insignificant.17
C.  Effects on Imports and Outputs
Import restrictions are widely thought to increase domestic output by protecting import-
competing production and diverting domestic spending away from imports toward domestically
produced  goods  and  services.  This  is  the  demand  side  effect  of  trade  tightening  and  its
disadvantage in relation to devaluation is that it only fosters import-competing production,  and
not exports.  On the other hand, there is the supply-side import starvation effect that results in
decline in output in the wake of trade tightenings.
Of the eleven trade tightenings, import growth was negative within two years in six cases
(table 6).  In the other five cases,  a  few fortuitous circumstances  raised imports despite the
tightening.  Thus, although Colombia tightened trade policies in 1967, imports increased in the
1967-69 period because of improved terms of trade.  This was also the case of Brazil in  1988
in response to a rather mild trade tightening episode."- 2
The  import-starvation  phenomenon  arises  from  stringent  import  restrictions  that  are
associated with QR regimes.  The QR regime robs the country of essential inputs and spare parts
to  run  factories  or  maintain crop  yields.  This  obviously  has an  adverse effect  on  output.
Although direct  evidence of  import starvation  is rare there  is adequate anecdotal material  to
suggest that the phenomenon is real. The evidence presented in table 7 shows that output growth
was negative within two years for four of the eleven trade tightening episodes."-'
17/  In addition, when import growth was regressed on trade policy episode with a dummny  variable of I  for trade
tightening and 0 for trade liberalization,  the trade policy term turned out to be negative and significant.  In other
words,  trade tightenings had a negative effect on import growth, while trade liberalizations had a positive effect.
This is consistent with the notion that trade tightening is done by moving items from a free list to a QR list, so that
trade tightenings reduce imports directly.
18/  In addition, when output growth was regressed on trade policy episodes with a dummy variable of  I for trade
tightening and 0 for trade liberalization, the trade policy term turned out to be negative and significant.  In other
words,  trade tightenings had a negative effect on output growth, while trade liberalizations had a positive effect.
This evidence together with the evidence from imports(foot note # 17) implies that trade tightening reduces imports,
and has an adverse effect on output gr' wth.18
Of course,  domestic output and imports could also decline simultaneously because of a
contraction of aggregate demand and in crises situations this has clearly been a factor.  But in
many cases,  output has declined because of tighter import restrictions rather than because of a
decline in the demand for output.
D. Effects on Manufactured Exports
The response of exports in general and manufactured exports in particular to trade policy
episodes  is expected to be slower than the response of  imports, since production  for exports
takes time while imports respond almost immediately. Trade policy could influence manufactured
exports in at least two ways: (i) trade policies change the regime of incentives facing producers
and exporters and alter the profitability of tradables vis-a-vis non-tradables, for instance through
changes in real exchange rates;"'  (ii) trade policies bring about changes in the availability of
imports that may be critical to the export production of manufactures.
In  practice,  this  latter  effect  is  likely  to  be  more  important  than  the  former  effect.
Therefore,  the impact of trade tightenings on manufactured exports is likely to work through the
effect  on  imports and  the  role  of  imported  inputs  in  export  production.  Policies  of  trade
tightenings usually do not influence exports directly. It is not often that trade tightening policies
restrain  exports,  unless  it is  in the  form  of  withdrawal of  some existing  export  incentives.
Additionally, analysis of trade policies in these six countries suggest that trade policy changes
in  most  cases  were  brought  about by  changes  in the QR  regime--specifically by  adding  or
removing  items from  the QR list.  Also  in some  cases,  trade  policy tightenings  have been
accompanied by raising export incentives.
Of  the  total  eleven  trade  tightening  episodes,  there  were  four  instances  where  trade
tightenings led to  declines in manufactured exports in the two years following changes in trade
policies  (table  8).  In the other eleven cases,  manufactured exports  increased  following trade
19/  Equation 5 in fact shows that trad  liberalizations are associated with devaluations.19
tightenings.  Of the fifteen trade  liberalizing episodes,  exports  increased  in eleven  cases,  and
declined  in  the  other four  cases.  This evidence  seems to  suggest that  overall,  trade  policy
changes have had a positive influence on manufactured exports. 2 "'
Regression results presented in table 9 suggest that trade tightenings do have a negative
impact upon both total and manufactured exports, though this evidence does not hold up when
the sample is expanded from 26 to 60 trade policy episodes by considering the duration of each
trade policy episode.  The results also suggest that, manufactured exports respond positively to
trade liberalizations.  One reason for this is that liberalizations are accompanied by devaluations
which improve the incentives for exports--including manufactures; the other factor is the greater
availability  of  imported  inputs  following  liberalization  that  are  usually  more  important  for
manufactured exports compared to other exports.
Table  9 also presents  the results of the regressions for total  and manufactured  exports
separately. Interestingly, the regression results are quite different for the two samples of 26 and
60 trade  policy episodes.  As  noted before,  trade tightenings have a  negative impact on total
exports as well as manufactured exports in the case of the 26 trade policy episodes; they have
no effect  when the sample size is expanded to 60 episodes.  One way to explain the negative
relationship between  trade  tightenings and  manufactured  exports  is to  note that  since trade
tightening is done primarily by way of moving items from a free list to a QR list, it starves the
industry  of critical  imported  inputs needed for export production and  hence have a negative
impact on exports. Therefore,  this result can also be construed as providing indirect support for
the import starvation hypothesis presented elsewhere in the paper.  More generally,  the trade-
tightening episodes could be viewed as increasing the anti-export bias of the trade regimes  in
these countries.  Also, the influence of import growth on exports turns out to be  negative in
these regressions.  This  negative role of  imports implies that the imports have been primarily
20/ However,  when growth  in manufactured  exports  was regressed  on trade policy  episodes  with a dummy  variable
of I  for trade tightening and 0 for trade liberalization,  the trade policy term turned out to be negative and
significant.  In other words, trade tightenings  had a  negative effect on  manufactured  exports, while trade
liberalizations  had a positive  effect.20
used in the production of import-substitutes for the domestic market rather than exports.  This
result is therefore  consistent with the earlier evidence regarding the overall inward-orientation
of these economies.  The proxy for external demand--OECD GDP--turns out to be insignificant
in these regressions.  This implies that the constraints on exports were primarily due to supply
rather  than demand factors. The proxy for domestic demand--GDP--is significant in the total
exports regression only; this effect is positive. This may simply reflect the fact, ceteris paribus,
exports and GDP tend to move in the same direction, given the GNP (national income) identity.
The other  implication of this result could be that exports  are not a  residual activity  in these
economies.  If exports were indeed a residual activity, the effect of domestic demand on exports
would be negative, since higher domestic demand would induce firms to shift from exports  to
the domestic market.  2ti  Finally,  the real effective exchange rate variable is not significant in
these regressions  involving 26 trade policy episodes.
When the sample size is expanded from 26 to 60 trade policy episodes by considering the
duration of each policy episode, the results are somewhat different.  Based on adjusted r2, while
there  is  a  deterioration  in  the  fit  for  total  exports,  there  is  a  marginal  improvement  for
manufactured exports,  when the sample size is expanded  from 26  to  60.  The trade  policy
variable and the import growth variable now turn out to be insignificant. In other words,  trade
policies  have  no  effect  on  exports--total as  well as  manufactured--in  the presence  of  other
variables  like real exchange rate,  imports, OECD GDP,  and domestic  (manufacturing) GDP.
This result with regard to trade policy in the expanded sample of 60 trade policy episodes also
implies  that it is more meaningful to  analyze the impact of trade policies by  considering the
episodes as a continuous process rather than as discrete episodes.  The real effective exchange
rate term is negative and significant for both total exports and manufactured exports.  This is
consistent  with  the  expectation  that exchange  rate  devaluations boost exports.  22'  While  the
external demand term is insignificant in the case of total exports,  it is positive and significant
21/  The implicit assumption here is that what is produced for domestic and export market are similar goods.
22/  This is also consistent with the results of equation 5 which shows that trade liberalizations are associated with
devaluations.21
in  the  case  of  manufactured  exports.  This  implies  that  demand  factors  do  play  a  role  in
determining manufactured exports from these countries. Finally, while the influence of domestic
demand is positive for total exports,  it turns out to be negative for manufactured exports.  The
negative role of domestic demand with regard to manufactured exports could be indicative of the
residual nature of exports in the case of manufactured goods. In other words,  both supply and
demand  factors are important ingredients of manufactured exports when the duration  of each
policy episode is taken into account.
V.  Conclusions
Changes  in  trade  policy--especially  in quantitative  import restrictions--have  played an
important role in the macroeconomic adjustment in all six countries.  For long periods,  trade
policy  tightenings  and  occasional  liberalizations  were  the  main  instruments  of  balance  of
payments policy.  Most tightenings were preceded by a deterioration  in the current  account.
In several cases tight import restrictions had adverse effects on output and, hence, on investment
and growth.  Since changes in trade policies were usually part of a policy package, it is difficult
to isolate the effects of the episodes themselves.  Sometimes they have been followed by current
account improvements and other times by deteriorations.
The six countries had various episodes of trade  liberalization, particularly in the 1980s.
There have been five regime changes where generalized trade liberalization by a country brought
about a break with the past use of QRs for balance of payments purposes and trade became much
freer.  The 1980s and early  1990s brought a new liberalization wherein balance of payments
problems triggered  liberalization rather than tightening.
The tightening of trade restrictions alone will not suffice to improve the current account.
This is confirmed by the experience of the six countries.  In the final analysis, an improvement
in the current  account requires an increase in national savings or a fall in investment, or both,22
and a tightening would not necessarily bring this about.  Where tighter import restrictions shift
demand toward home-produced goods and output is initially demand-constrained, higher incomes
would indeed result and then savings would normally increase, at least in the short run.  At the
same time,  in an environment of import starvation, as was present in Argentina (1980-83) and
Chile  (1971-73),  incomes might fall as a result of tighter  restrictions,  and  so savings might
actually decline.  A fall in imports would then be more than matched by a decline in exports.
The case for tighter import restrictions or devaluation when the current account has to be
improved is that both measures divert demand away from imports toward home-produced goods
and increase the profitability of import-competing industries.  In addition, devaluation increases
the profitability  of exports.  Thus,  these policy instruments compensate for  the reduction  in
demand for home-produced goods resulting from the decline in real expenditures that is usually
necessary to bring about a current account improvement.  They switch demand toward nontraded
goods and output toward traded goods.  This simple generalization is subject to qualifications.
In particular,  import restrictions may reduce the competitiveness of export industries when they
use  imported  or  import-competing inputs.  Leaving this  aside,  there  is a case for  switching
policies even though a reduction in real expenditures (absorption) is--in the absence of  initial
excess  capacity--the  essential  requirement  for  a  current  account  improvement.  Yet,  the
fundamental question is whether to use import restrictions or devaluation as the switching device.
This choice raises issues discussed at length in the literature.  Here the consensus appears to be
that  import  restrictions  should be avoided,  except perhaps  temporary  restrictions  in extreme
situations.  The current recourse to such measures by Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico should be
viewed in this perspective.
Three policy conclusions emerge  from the analysis.  The first is the confirmation of the
consensus view  that import restrictions cannot solve current account problems, as seen from the
experience  of the  six  countries.  Import restrictions,  even when  they  lead to  a  short  term
improvement, cannot be relied upon to restore macroeconomic balance.  The imbalance will not
go  away  but  could  be  exacerbated  when exports  continue to  be  adversely  effected  and  the23
phenomenon of import starvation introduces additional costs to the economy arising from the
attempt to cure the original problem.
Second,  trade  liberalization  requires  real  devaluation  either  at  the  same  time  or
beforehand.  Real devaluation is brought about by nominal devaluation.  The evidence for such
a connection between exchange rate policy and trade policy is clear.  A flexible exchange rate
regime does not ensure  that trade policy tightening will be avoided.  This is apparent from the
policies of Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  and Colombia  in the first  period (1965-73) and those of
Argentina in the third period (1980-83); but a fixed rate regime that rules out the possibility of
devaluation makes significant liberalization improbable or even impossible.  If a country has
significant import restrictions  over a range of goods (or high tariffs), and desires to liberalize
eventually, then the government must not make a fixed exchange rate commitment.  The nominal
anchor argument can provide some justification for a fixed exchange rate policy,  but given that
continued import restrictions are not desirable,  such a policy should only be implemented--if at
all--after a large devaluation and the required  liberalization have taken place as seen from the
cases of Argentina and Mexico.
Finally, with regard to manufactured exports, their growth helps to maintain trade reforms
and release the economy from foreign exchange constraints; also, manufactured exports respond
more  to  trade  liberalizations  than tightenings because  liberalizations reduce  the bias  against
exports.24
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facts.  World Bank Economic Review 8:  1-16.Table 1:  Trade Policy Episodes  by Analytical  Periods and Exchange  Rate Regimes
Country  1965--73  1974--79  1980-83  1984-94
Argentina  (-)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-)
1967  1971--73  1976  1982  1989  1991
devaluation  flexible rate  fixed rate
flexible  flexible rate  flexible  rate
Brazil  (-)(+)  ()  (+) 
1967  1973--74  1979--80  1981--84  1988  1990
flexible  rate  flexible rate  flexible rate  flexible rate  flexible  rate
Chile  (-)  (+)
1968--70  1971--73  1974--79
flexible rate  devaluation  devaluation
flexible rate until 1974  flexible rate  Adopted flexible rate
Colombia  (+)  (+)  ())a
1967  1982  1984--87  1991
flexible  rate  flexible  rate
crawling peg  crawling peg  1985 crawling peg
Costa Rica  (+)  (+
1974  1982--84  1986--88  1991
devaluation/1981
devaluation  unified rate/1983  adopted flexible  rate
Mexico  ()  (+)  (
fixed rate  1977--79  1980--82  1985-90
devaluation/ 1976  devaluation/  1982  devaluation/  1985
fixed rate thereafter  devaluation/ 1986
fixed rate/1988
Totals  6 episodes  +3  -3  5 episodes  +2  -3  6 episodes  +5  -1  9 episodes  + 1  -8
Note:  a. Indicates trade regime change defined as the case where there was no recourse to trade policies for macroeconomic  purposes following  this change.
b. (+)  indicates  trade tightening  and (-) indicates trade liberalization.
Source:  Papageorgiou, Michaely, and Choksi (1991); Little. Cooper, Corden and Rajapatirana  (1993); Alam and Rajapatirana  (1993)Table 2:  Trade Policy Episodes, Trade Regime Changes and the Exchange Rate,  1965-92
1965--73  1974--79  1980--83  1984--94  1965--94
Trade policy tightening  3  2  5  1  11
Exchange rate
devalued or flexible
during episode  3  2  4  1  10
Exchange rate fixed
during episode  0  0  1  0  13
Trade policy liberalization  3  3  1  8  15
Exchange rate
devalued or  flexible
during episode  3  3a  1  8  15
Exchange rate fixed
during episode  0  0  0  0  °
No changes in trade policy  6  5  6  11  26
Note:  a.  Mexico had devalued in 1976 just  before the liberalization in 1977.
b.  Argentina and Mexico had devalued significantly just  before the liberalization.
Source:  World Bank, Papageorgiou, Michaely and Choksi (1991), (Table 1) References.Table 3:  Trade Policies and Ratio of Current Account Balance (CAB) to GDP (percent)
Tightening Episodes  Liberalizing Episodes
. . ~~~~~~Average  Average
(CAB/GDP) in  (CAB/GDP)  (CAB/GDP) in  (CAB/GDP)
Country  Period  Year of Policy  After Two Years  Country  Period  Year of Policy  After Two Years
Argentina  1971-73  -1.0  0.0  Argentina  1967  0.5  -0.5
Argentina  1980-83  -3.0  -2.0  Argentina  1976  1.0  2.5
Brazil  1973-74  -3.0  -6.5  Argentina  1989  -2.0  1.5
Brazi'  1981-84  -5.0  -4.5  Argentina  1991  0.0  -3.0
Brazil  1988  1.0  -0.5  Brazil  1967  -1.1  -1.4
Chile  1971-73  -2.0  -3.5  Brazil  1979-80  -5.0  -5.5
Colombia  1967  0.0  -3.4  Brazil  1990  -1.0  1.0
Colombia  1982  -8.0  -6.0  Chile  1968-70  -2.0  0.0
Costa Rica  1974  -16.0  -9.5  Chile  1974-79  -3.0  -3.0
Costa Rica  1982-84  -11.0  -8.5  Colombia  1984-87  -4.0  -2.0
Mexico  1980-82  -6.0  -5.5  Colombia  1991  6.0  -1.0
Average  -4.9  -4.5  Costa Rica  1986-88  -4.0  -9.5
Costa Rica  1991  -7.0  -7.0
Mexico  1977-79  -1.0  -1.5
Mexico  1985-90  0.0  1.0
Average  -1.5  -1.9
Notes:  Figures in the table show the (CAB/GDP) ratio in the year of the trade regime change and the average (CAB/GDP) ratio two years after the
policy change.
Source:  World Bank data.Table 4:  Current  Account  and Trade Policies: Panel Data Regressions
Real  GDP  Terms
Exchange  Fiscal  Growth  of  Trade Policy
Rate  Balance/GDP  OECD  Trade
Adjusted
t  t-l  t-l  t  t  t-l  t-2  t-3  t4  R2 DF
-0.036a  0.219a  0 .4 15b  0.034a  - - - - - 0.149  161
(-3.81)  (2.91)  (2.32)  (3.68)
11  -0.034a  0.207  0.396b  0.033'  -0.728  - 0.156  161
(-3.56)  (2.73)  (2.21)  (3.58)  (-1.53)
l  -0.036a  0.215a  0.412  0.034  - -0.269  - 0.145  161
(-3.73)  (2.82)  (2.29)  (3.65)  (-0.56)
IV  -0.036  0.223a  0.414  0.033  - - 0.209  - - 0.144  161
(-3.77)  (2.93)  (2.31)  (3.62)  (0.43)
V  -0.034a  0.224a  0 .398b  0.032  - - - 0.635  - 0.152  161
(-3.56)  (2.97)  (2.22)  (3.51)  (1.27)
VI  -0.036'  0.222a  0.395b  0.033'  - 0.384  0.146  161
(-3.70)  (2.94)  (2.18)  (3.64)  (0.75)
Note:  Figures in parentheses are t statistics.  DF are the degrees of freedom.
a.  Indicates statistically significant at I percent level.
b.  Indicates statistically significant at 5 percent level.
Source:  Author's  analyses.30
Table 5:  Trade Policies and Trade Tax Revenues
(percent)
Ti2htenine  Episodes  Liberalizing Episodes
Percent  Percent
Country  Period  Change  Country  Period  Change
Argentina  1982  24  Argentina  1991  N.A.
Brazil  1981--84  64  Brazil  1979--80  -50
Colombia  1982  -15  Brazil  1990  N.A.
Costa Rica  1974  -8  Chile  1974-79  2
Costa Rica  1982--84  1  Colombia  1984-87  39
Mexico  1980-82  15  Colombia  1991  N.A.
Costa Rica  1986-88  41
Costa Rica  1992  N.A.
Average  14  Average  13
Note:  Figure  in the table show annual average growth of trade tax revenues for the two years following the
year  in which the trade regime changed.
N.A.  - Not Available
Source:  World Bank data.Table 6:  Trade Policies and Import Growth (%)
Tightening Episodes  |  Liberalizing Episodes
Country  Period  Percent  Country  Period  Percent
Argentina  1971-73  -5.0  Argentina  1967  13.5
Argentina  1980-83  -26.1  Argentina  1976  2.9
Brazil  1973-74  13.2  Argentina  1989  45.9
Brazil  1981-84  -9.9  Argentina  1991  75.8
Brazil  1988  21.2  Brazil  1967  11.1
Chile  1971-73  -15.2  Brazil  1979-80  -5.4
Colombia  1967  14.6  Brazil  1990  3.1
Colombia  1982  -7.6  Chile  1968-70  8.6
Costa Rica  1974  2.0  Chile  1974-79  -7.2
Costa Rica  1982-84  9.3  Colombia  1984-87  -10.0
Mexico  1980-82  -5.2  Colombia  1991  50.3
Average  -0.8  Costa Rica  1986-88  2.4
Costa Rica  1991  7.6
Mexico  1977-79  30.5
Mexico  1985-90  -20.2
Average  13.9
Notes:  Figures in the table show annual average growth in merchandise imports for the two years following the year in which the trade regime changed.
Source:  World Bank data.Table 7:  Trade  Policies and Output  Growth (%)
Tightening Episodes  Liberalizing Episodes
Country  Period  Percent  Country  Period  Percent
Argentina  1971-73  2.4  Argentina  1967  7.1
Argentina  1980-83  -4.4  Argentina  1976  1.3
Brazil  1973-74  7.1  Argentina  1989  4.5
Brazil  1981-84  -1.4  Argentina  1991  7.4
Brazil  1988  -3.1  Brazil  1967  10.6
Chile  1971-73  -2.9  Brazil  1979-80  2.4
Colombia  1967  6.5  Brazil  1990  0.0
Colombia  1982  2.5  Chile  1968-70  2.8
Costa Rica  1974  3.8  Chile  1974-79  -4.0
Costa Rica  1982-84  5.5  Colombia  1984-87  4.5
Mexico  1980-82  4.1  Colombia  1991  4.4
Average  1.8  Costa Rica  1986-88  4.1
Costa Rica  1991  6.9
Mexico  1977-79  8.8
Mexico  1985-90  -0.8
Average  4.0
Notes:  Figures in the table show annual average growth in GDP for the two years following the year in which the trade regime changed.
Source:  World Bank data.Table 8:  Trade Policies and Growth of Manufactured Exports (%)
Tightening Episodes  Liberalizing Episodes
Country  Period  Percent  Country  1  Period  |  Percent
Argentina  1971-73  31.4  Argentina  1967  26.2
Argentina  1980-83  7.0  Argentina  1976  26.0
Brazil  1973-74  24.0  Argentina  1989  -11.6
Brazil  1981-84  4.4  Argentina  1991  -4.9
Brazil  1988  -2.5  Brazil  1967  11.6
Chile  1971-73  -26.3  Brazil  1979-80  24.8
Colombia  1967  15.4  Brazil  1990  13.6
Colombia  1982  -9.0  Chile  1968-70  23.7
Costa Rica  1974  6.3  Chile  1974-79  79.1
Costa Rica  1982-84  -3.9  Colombia  1984-87  10.2
Mexico  1980-82  4.  Colombia  1991  -9.1
Average  4.6  Costa Rica  1986-88  13.3
Costa Rica  1991  -4.2
Mexico  1977-79  21.2
Mexico  1985-90  24.0
. ____________________  . _____________________  A  verage  16.3
Notes:  Figures in the table show annual average growth in manufactured exports for the two years following the year in which the trade regime changed.
Source:  World Bank data.Table 9:  Export Regressions
Total Exports  Manufactured Exports
l_________  _  NT=26  NT=60  |  NT=26  J  NT=60
Real effective exchange rate  0.168  -0.204  0.338  -0.449
(0.74)  (-1.39)  (0.76)  (-1.92)
Trade policy  -8.998  -4.284  -18.845  2.205
(-2.06)  (-0.95)  (-2.19)  (0.30)
Imports  -0.184  0.027  -0.364  0.124
(-1.27)  (0.20)  (-1.29)  (0.62)
OECD GDP  -1.401  -0.775  0.582  5.403
(-0.99)  (-0.55)  (0.20)  (2.29)
Total GDP  1.160  0.708
(1.95)  (1.29)  _
Manufacturing GDP  -0.779  -1.434
(-0.93)  (-2.53)
Adjusted R 2 0.146  0.048  0.102  0.107
Notes:  For trade policy, a dummy variable, TI, is used; TI= 1 for trade tightening policies and Tl=0  for trade liberalization policies. All other variables
are expressed in terms of growth rates.
Source:  Author's  analyses.
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